At least 40,000 people have been killed in Turkey’s civil war, which has lasted more than 40 years. Hopes for a permanent resolution have been reignited by a new peace initiative, the first serious attempt since the failed negotiations of 2013-2015.
The first public indication of this latest initiative came in October 2024 from an unexpected source: Devlet Bahçeli, the far-right leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), who suggested that the imprisoned leader of a Kurdish militant group could be granted parole if he renounced violence and dissolved his organization.
A close political ally of President Tayyip Erdogan, Bahçeli’s statement is widely believed to have had Erdogan’s personal endorsement. Even more unexpectedly, Bahçeli referenced the European Convention on Human Rights’ (ECHR) “right to hope” and the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) related jurisprudence.
Although Turkey is a signatory to the ECHR, it has frequently disregarded or violated its rulings, particularly in cases involving high-profile political prisoners. The “right to hope” doctrine states that prisoners serving life sentences – particularly political prisoners – should be eligible for release or home confinement after 25 years, a milestone that Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), reached in 2024.
In October 2024, Bahçeli suggested that Ocalan could be released from his Imrali Island prison if he called for the PKK to disband. After a year of negotiations, Ocalan issued a public call on February 27, 2025, urging the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve itself.
On the surface, stark differences remain between Ocalan’s message and the rhetoric from Erdogan and Bahçeli. While Ocalan views disarmament as the first step in a broader peace process, Erdogan and Bahçeli continue to push for the complete eradication of “terrorism,” a “terror-free state,” and the PKK’s unconditional surrender.
Political and geopolitical motivations
The key question is whether there is any real convergence between the perspectives of the Turkish government and the Kurdish leadership. The motivations behind this new initiative provide some insight.
One factor may be Turkey’s geopolitical standing. The country has found itself increasingly sidelined in recent political and economic initiatives in the Middle East and West Asia. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have strengthened their influence as Sunni powerhouses, while Iran remains dominant on the Shia side. Some analysts argue that Ankara now recognizes that achieving lasting peace within Turkey is crucial to restoring its regional influence.
Turkey initially gained significant leverage in the “new” Syria following President Bashar al-Assad’s fall in December 2024. However, this influence appears to be waning. The most striking sign of this decline came on March 10, when the interim Syrian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Beyond regional geopolitics, the Turkish state has been unable to secure a military defeat of the PKK in the decade since the last peace talks collapsed, resulting in a prolonged stalemate.
Erdogan may also have personal political motivations. He is widely believed to be seeking constitutional changes to secure a third presidential term. By initiating a Kurdish peace process, he may aim to sway Kurdish voters—who represent 30 percent of Turkey’s population—away from the opposition and towards his ruling AK Party (AKP).
On the Kurdish side, the prolonged military stalemate, widespread war fatigue, and the desire for a lasting peace appear to be key drivers behind the latest developments. The potential release of Ocalan, along with other high-profile Kurdish political prisoners, may also be a significant factor. This was underscored in mid-March when Selahattin Demirtas, the imprisoned former co-chair of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), issued a letter from jail titled “Do Not Be Afraid! Bring Peace”.
Against this backdrop, Turkey’s government leveraged the ECHR’s “right to hope” as a strategic tool to initiate the Imrali talks in 2024. However, this incentive was swiftly withdrawn following Ocalan’s February 27 statement.
On March 18, Justice Minister Yilmaz Tunc ruled out the possibility of parole for Ocalan and prohibited him from delivering a video message for the upcoming Newroz celebrations. He also dismissed the prospect of a general amnesty for other political prisoners. This decision marks an early blow to hopes for a sustainable peace in Turkey.
Unilateral ceasefire met with military strikes
Following Ocalan’s call for disarmament, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire on March 1 —its ninth since 1993. However, the Turkish military continued air and ground assaults on PKK positions in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) from March 1-3. Despite Bahçeli’s rhetoric, Turkey’s armed forces appear unwilling to reciprocate the ceasefire.
Justice Minister Yilmaz Tunc made it clear that the call to lay down arms applied solely to the PKK and not to the Turkish government or military. He stated that, despite the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire, Turkish forces would continue their operations against the group.
Democratization and peace: An inseparable link
One crucial but often overlooked issue is that lasting Kurdish peace is inseparable from broader democratic reforms in Turkey. President Erdogan has shown little interest in expanding democratic freedoms, leaving Turkey’s democratic institutions fragile.
The arrest of around 100 people on March 19, including Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, a key opposition figure and the leading challenger to President Tayyip Erdogan, has raised fresh concerns over Türkiye’s already fragile democracy and the Kurdish “peace” initiative. Imamoglu, widely expected to be named the Republican People’s Party (CHP) presidential candidate on March 23 , was detained on charges of “aiding a terrorist organization” linked to the PKK. Authorities also restricted access to social media platforms, including X, while Istanbul University revoked his diploma – moves seen as efforts to bar him from running for president.
In this context, the fate of the opposition CHP’s 20-point democratization package, introduced in early March, takes on added significance. The plan includes a proposal to establish an all-party parliamentary commission to address the Kurdish issue, but Imamoglu’s arrest may overshadow this, along with other key reforms in the package. Its success will depend on approval from the CHP leadership – now likely to fast-track it – and the Turkish parliament, followed by consistent implementation if passed.
Significant ideological shifts would be required, particularly within the CHP’s secular-nationalist base, which has historically opposed Kurdish political rights. The AKP and MHP’s commitment to a centralized, homogenized Turkish identity has also been a major obstacle, blocking Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights for decades. Without fundamental changes, real progress remains unlikely.
Can Syria provide a model for Kurdish rights?
While Turkey remains central to Kurdish aspirations for recognition and autonomy, Syria may currently offer a more promising path forward. A landmark agreement was reached on March 10 between Mazloum Abdi, the SDF commander, and Ahmed al-Sharaa of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). For the first time, Kurdish identity and citizenship have been formally recognized as integral to a national framework, granting Kurds equal political, economic, and cultural rights.
This agreement represents a historic step, but much remains uncertain. Implementation details will be critical, and challenges lie ahead. However, the deal provides a rare glimmer of optimism for Syrian Kurds.
If successful, Syria’s approach could have wider implications. It may encourage Turkey’s Kurdish population to push for similar rights and inspire Kurdish communities in Iraq, Iran, and the broader diaspora. A genuine democratic transformation in Turkey remains the ultimate test, but developments in Syria could help pave the way for broader Kurdish recognition across the region.
(The author is Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Boston University Global Development Policy Center (GDPC) and has Guest Lectured at the School of Interwoven Arts and Sciences (SIAS), Krea University, India. This article was originally published under Creative Commons by 360info)
