Bangladesh and India, the best of friends in South Asia till four months ago, are now seemingly opposed to each other.
Bangladesh is grappling with a range of domestic political issues, including growing Islamist resurgence. There is apprehension that the increasing popularity of extreme right-wing forces may impact regional stability as well as Dhaka-New Delhi ties.
Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s visit to Dhaka on December 9 took place against the backdrop of a war of words marked by allegations of attacks on Bangladesh’s Hindu minorities. This, in turn, flared up anti-India sentiments already simmering in the aftermath of the August 5 students’ movement in Bangladesh.
The Indian charge was quickly thwarted by Dhaka, with Misri’s counterpart, Mohammad Jashim Uddin, claiming that “this is an internal matter for Bangladesh" and that "foreign comments on our internal issues are inappropriate”.
Since Misri’s visit, the temperatures in the two capitals have dropped sharply.
What is inescapable, however, is the sudden upsurge in Islamist tendencies in Bangladesh, which lay dormant during the Awami League’s 15-year rule as a consequence of the strong-arm approach of the security apparatus.
No sooner did Sheikh Hasina flee to India on August 5, that the political landscape was marked by intense activity: the Jamaat-e-Islami, which had virtually been banned during Hasina’s tenure, returned to the mainstream in full force.
Most of its leaders, including its amir (chief) Shafiqur Rahman, gave interviews to TV news channels and the print media. Bangladesh Army chief General Waker-uz-Zaman even invited the Jamaat to an all-party meeting soon after Hasina fled Dhaka.
The Yunus-led regime took little time to lift the ban on the Jamaat, which swiftly reopened its offices across the country.
The hardline Hifazat-e-Islam, which was consistently placated by Hasina since its formation in 2010, also returned to the political centrestage. The Yunus interim regime inducted the organization’s deputy chief A F M Khalid Hossain as the Religious Affairs advisor.
Hizbut Tahrir’s growth
But the most spectacular resurgence has been that of the Hizbut Tahrir Bangladesh which is alleged to be the real force behind the students’ movement that unseated Hasina from power.
Banned in 2009, the Hizbut Tahrir took no time to make its presence felt after August 5, calling for the establishment of a Khalifat (Caliphate) in Bangladesh, based on Sharia laws, to ensure “true justice and welfare” for all. A month later, it mounted pressure on the interim regime to revoke the 2009 ban on the organization.
The interim regime has not yet acted on this demand. However, it seems to have made room for Hizbut Tahrir’s entry into government.
On August 28, Mahfuz Alam, said to be the mastermind of the students’ movement and an alleged Hizbut member, was appointed special assistant to Yunus. Two months later, he was appointed an advisor to the interim government.
Since then, Alam has made several provocative anti-India statements on social media.
The rise in the influence, if not popularity, of Islamist forces in Bangladesh must be seen in the context of the Hasina regime’s overtly pro-India stance and its so-called concessions related to “political and security cooperation, defence, trade and connectivity, water resources, power and energy and development”, to New Delhi.
Over a period of 15 years, marked by malgovernance, transactional collaborations with New Delhi and frequent instances of human rights excesses, the Hasina-led government’s policies only caused anti-India sentiments to spread.
While US president elect Donald Trump’s October 24 tweet on alleged atrocities against the minority Hindus served to rile Bangladeshis, including those in the interim government, statements by Indian political leaders on Bangladesh’s December 16 Victory Day sparked sharp reactions among political parties, including the Jamaat.
Dhaka sees the tweets by the Indian political leadership which only mentioned India's (and not Bangladesh's) role in the 1971 war as another foreign policy misstep that could deepen anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh.
West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s appeal for deployment of UN peacekeepers in Bangladesh was also viewed in Dhaka as unwarranted, especially at a time when Kolkata’s economy – it receives a large number of Bangladeshi tourists and patients – took a hit thanks to India closing down its visa centres.
Toning down communal narrative
The communal narratives perpetuated across a spectrum of the Indian political leadership will only coalesce anti-India forces which, in turn, may strengthen the hands of far right and extremist elements in Bangladesh.
The Hindutva narrative on the so-called communal situation in Bangladesh will serve to push such extremist outfits to rake up minority persecution in India, especially in the wake of the controversy over the National Register of Citizens and the Citizenship Amendment Act.
New Delhi may end up damaging the bilateral relations further if its establishment consciously harps on the rise of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh. That is likely to be seen as an argument to somehow pave the way for the Awami League’s return to power.
This would be counter-productive especially at a time when the Yunus-led interim authority is yet to get a firm grip on governance. The domestic political situation continues to be fluid and the regime needs time to bring democratic institutions back on track.
The interim government assumed charge at a time when democratic institutions, the judiciary, law and order and the electoral system had been subverted. The economic situation that the interim government inherited continues to be challenging, requiring sustained international support.
In these circumstances, Bangladeshis expected a positive Indian role in economic reconstruction and institutional reforms.
Instead, hostile propaganda, followed by the attack on Bangladeshi’s consulate in Agartala in Tripura and the “desecretion” of the national flag have contributed to considerable unease in Dhaka.
In the face of several challenges to bilateral relations, New Delhi needs to acknowledge that the political dynamics of Bangladesh have changed. The Indian establishment should adopt a foreign policy which promotes mutual interests and engage with all Bangladeshi political parties.
Supporting the Yunus administration in stabilizing the economy and reinforcing political and democratic institutions will help keep Islamist elements at bay.
(The author is a Professor of International Relations at Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka. This article was originally published under Creative Commons by 360info)
