Which US presidential candidate — Democrat Kamala Harris or Republican Donald Trump — is likely to be more sympathetic towards Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s India if they were to assume office?
It may well be “Make America Great Again” Trump rather than vice-president Harris, despite her Indian parentage.
Although she has publicly acknowledged her Indian heritage, Harris has not demonstrated any particular interest in or concern for India during her time in office.
This may be entirely understandable. As vice-president, it is her duty to publicly affirm the policy stance of the administration. Furthermore, showing overt sympathy or concern for India could expose her to charges of split loyalties.
Were she to assume the presidency, however, personal sentiments aside, her policies would likely reflect key American national interests as she and her party understand them. Accordingly, her policies would probably exhibit a significant degree of continuity with those of the Biden administration.
The Biden administration, like those of several of its predecessors, has granted India considerable strategic significance, primarily due to the rise and increasing assertiveness of China across Asia.
Consequently, it has generally been reluctant to criticize domestic political developments within India. It even avoided a public spat with New Delhi over the alleged involvement of Indian intelligence in an attempt to kill a Sikh secessionist, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, in New York — presumably due to New Delhi’s strategic value.
A similar case in Canada has blown up into a major diplomatic row between the Indian and Canadian governments.
Nuanced Harris
A Harris administration might adopt a more nuanced approach in its dealings with New Delhi.
Without publicly breaking with the administration, she has nevertheless demonstrated a degree of empathy for the party’s left wing on the complex issue of the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
As this segment of the party tends to be more concerned about human rights abroad than the Democratic mainstream, she may be compelled to heed their concerns regarding religious and ethnic tensions in India.
If she chooses to make this a key aspect of her foreign policy towards New Delhi, it could easily place her at odds with the Modi government.
Transactional Trump
A Trump presidency, however, is unlikely to advocate for human rights in India under any circumstances. Instead, if the past is any indication, he will overlook this issue entirely.
His approach towards New Delhi will almost certainly be wholly transactional.
If the perceived interests of his administration align with those of New Delhi — from defence cooperation to trade and investment — he will not concern himself with domestic political developments in India.
Consequently, from a purely instrumental standpoint, policymakers in New Delhi may well prefer a Trump administration, despite his idiosyncratic approach to policymaking.
Democrats then, Republicans now
During the Cold War, there was a widespread belief in Indian foreign policy circles that Democrats were more likely to be sympathetic to India’s concerns than Republicans. This assumption was mostly correct.
As early as 1954, the Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower administration signed a military pact with Pakistan, thereby bolstering the military capabilities of India’s troublesome neighbour and impinging on India’s national security.
Later, many Indian foreign policy analysts highlighted that it was Republican Richard Nixon who sent the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in a failed exercise of coercive diplomacy during the East Pakistan crisis in 1971.
They also fondly recall that a Democrat president, John Kennedy, rushed military assistance to India during the Chinese invasion along India’s Himalayan border in October 1962.
This pattern, however, was broken at the Cold War’s end. The Clinton administration adopted a tough stance on human rights violations as India sought to suppress the insurgency in Kashmir. It also imposed a range of sanctions on New Delhi following India’s May 1998 nuclear tests.
The George W. Bush administration, on the other hand, initiated the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership programme with India in 2004. Notably, it undertook an extraordinarily bold step by signing the US-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement in 2008.
Since that breakthrough, coupled with India’s rapid economic growth and the expansion of people-to-people contacts, US-India relations have enjoyed remarkable bilateral consensus.
When he was president, Trump, despite imposing some tariffs on a handful of Indian goods, largely continued the policies of the two Obama administrations.
One issue on which he differed was human rights.
Obama, towards the end of his presidency, publicly raised the issue of growing religious intolerance in India during a state visit.
In contrast, Trump, during his term in office, exhibited no such reservations and seemed to forge a cordial personal relationship with Modi.
President Biden, despite some pressures from specific Congressional Democrats, particularly in the US House of Representatives, has not publicly chastised New Delhi regarding democracy and human rights.
Moreover, during the Galwan crisis between India and China in the spring of 2020, Washington shared real-time intelligence with New Delhi about the People’s Liberation Army movements and capabilities in Ladakh.
Despite the current uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the US presidential election, barring any entirely unexpected adverse developments, the existing ballast in the US-India partnership should ensure that it remains reasonably stable regardless of which candidate emerges victorious.
(The author is the Director of the Huntington Program on Strengthening US-India Relations at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. This article was originally published under Creative Commons by 360info)
